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Abstract 
 
This paper uses cross-country data compiled immediately after the Fukushima 
nuclear accident to investigate how the experience of such disasters affects the 
perception of the risk of nuclear accidents. Estimation results show that the perceived 
risk of a nuclear accident is positively associated with experiencing technological 
disasters but not with that of natural disasters. 
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1. Introduction 
The devastating earthquake that occurred in Japan on March 11, 2011 was 
followed by a tsunami that ultimately crippled the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plants. These unprecedented disasters drew public attention from around the world. A 
G8 Summit was held 2 months after the Japanese disaster, and countries agreed to join 
forces in an effort to promote tighter international standards for nuclear safety.  
A number of studies have previously considered perceptions and responses 
regarding low-probability events (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004). To experience a natural 
disaster may influence individual risk beliefs through the updating of one’s risk level. 
From the viewpoint of rational Bayesian learning, one would expect perceived risk to 
increase after experiencing a disaster. The Japanese disaster shows that nuclear 
disaster can be caused not only by human error with regard to technology, but also by 
unexpected natural disasters. Therefore, one’s perception regarding the risk of nuclear 
accidents appears to depend not only the experience of technological disasters but also 
on that of natural disasters. 
It has been argued that people who have experienced a disaster do not 
sufficiently update their perceived level of risk (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Viscurrsi 
and Zeckhauser 2006). As noted by Zeckhauser (1996, p. 115), ―Neither humans nor 
society deal effectively with information, particularly probabilistic information.‖ Thus, 
the issue of the relationship between the subjective risk of a nuclear accident and 
experiencing natural and technological disasters appears to remain open to discussion. 
The perceptions of citizens’ regarding risk do have an influence on policy concerning 
disasters (Viscurrsi and Zeckhauser, 2006; Kahn, 2007). Thus, it is worth exploring the 
relationship between them. 
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By using cross-country data collected immediately after the disaster in Japan in 
2011, this paper aims to investigate how the experience of a technological disaster 
effects perceptions regarding the subjective risk of a nuclear accident.  
 
2. Data and Model  
Definitions and the descriptive statistics of variables used in this paper are 
presented in Table 1. Immediately after Japan’s natural disaster, WIN-Gallup 
International (2011) conducted a survey in 47 countries regarding nuclear energy. The 
survey included the following question: ―How high or low is your concern about the 
possibility of a nuclear incident in your country?‖ There were 5 response choices: ―very 
high‖, ―high‖, ―medium‖, ―low‖, and ―very low‖. The WIN-Gallup International (2011) 
survey provides the responses for each county. Based on the WIN-Gallup survey data, I 
calculated the rate of respondents that believed there is a high (or very high) possibility 
of a nuclear accident—dependent variable PACCI. In addition, an alternative measure, 
PACCI2, is the rate of those respondents who believe there to be a very high possibility 
of nuclear accident. PACCI (or PACCI2) measures the subjective risk of a nuclear 
accident and is, therefore, used as a dependent variable. A key independent variable is 
the number of technological disasters that have occurred (in the respondent country) 
since 1990 (TDIS), which captures the experience of technological disasters. A cursory 
examination of Figure 1 shows that TDIS is positively associated with PACCI. The 
Fukushima nuclear accident was triggered by an earthquake and tsunami. Hence, the 
risk of natural disaster appears to be related to the perceived risk of a nuclear accident. 
Therefore, the experience of a natural disaster, a further independent variable, is 
captured by the number of natural disasters that have occurred (in the respondent 
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country) since 1990 (NDIS).1 For a closer examination of the relationship, regression 
estimations were conducted. The estimated function takes the following form: 
PACCI (or PACCI2)i = 0 + 1Ln(TDIS)i + 2Ln(NDIS)i + 3Ln(GDP)i + 4Ln(POP)i + 
5Ln(GOVSIZ)i + 6NUCLEi + ei,  
where PACCI (or PACCI2) represents the subjective risk of a nuclear accident in 
country i,  represents regression parameters, and e is an error term. With the 
exception of the key variables explained earlier (TDIS and NDIS), the following control 
variables were included as independent variables. Economic factors were captured by 
population (POP), GDP per capita (GDP), and the size of government (GOVSIZ).2 The 
greater the number of nuclear energy plants in an area, the higher the possibility a 
nuclear accident. The number of nuclear energy plants (NUCLE) is included to control 
for this effect3. As can be seen in Table 1, the standard deviations of each independent 
variable are large, thus, heteroscedasticity should be taken into account. To reduce 
heteroscedasticity, each independent variable, with the exception of NUCLE, is in log 
form.4  
It is more likely than not, that nuclear plants are constructed in countries where 
people perceive there to be a low probability of nuclear accidents occurring. The OLS 
estimation results above possibly suffer from endogeneity bias because a reverse 
causality occurs between the dependent variable and independent variable (NUCLE). 
For the purpose of controlling for this bias, instrumental variables were used to conduct 
                                                   
1 TDIS and NDIS were obtained from the International Disaster Database 
http://www.emdat.be (accessed April 30, 2011). 
2 The data was sourced from the Penn World Table (PWT 6.3). It is available at 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (accessed 28 March 2011).  
3 POP, GDP, and GOSIZ are the values for 2007. NUCLE is the value for 2011. 
4 NUCLE is 0 in some countries where no nuclear plant exists and therefore cannot be 
expressed as a logarithm. 
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a GMM 2SLS (generalized method of moments two-stage least square) estimation.5 
Sufficient land area is required to build nuclear plants. Thus, densely populated 
countries encounter great difficulties in searching for space in which to build nuclear 
plants. Therefore, land area and population density were used as instrumental 
variables in the GMM 2SLS estimations. The data for the instrumental variables were 
sourced from World Development Indicators.6 
 
3. Results 
The estimation results for OLS are exhibited in Table 2. The results with PACCI 
as the dependent variable are presented in columns (1) and (2), and those for PACCI2 
are shown in columns (3) and (4). The results of the GMM 2SLS estimations are shown 
in Table 3. The sample size was only 37 and therefore considered small. Thus, the 
jackknife method was used to calculate the standard error to ensure that the results 
were not spurious. 
In Table 2, the results for Ln(TDIS) yielded the predicted positive signs, and were 
statistically significant in all estimations. The absolute values of Ln(TDIS) were 
approximately 15.4 and 15.1 in the PACCI estimation for columns (1) and (2), 
respectively, and 10.7 and 10.4 for PACCI2 in columns (3) and (4), respectively. These 
results imply that a 1% increase in TDIS increases PACCI by approximately 15%, 
whereas a 1% increase in TDIS increases PACCI2 by about 10%. In contrast, NIDS was 
not statistically significant although NDIS did produce the anticipated positive sign. 
                                                   
5 The GMM estimator allows for heteroscedasticity and brings efficiency gains in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity (Greene 2008, Ch. 15). This is why I used the GMM 2SLS 
rather than the 2SLS model. 
6 The data are available from the World Bank website: 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do (accessed 28 March 2011). 
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With the exception of POP, the other control variables were not statistically significant 
in all estimations. 
With regard to the GMM 2SLS estimation results exhibited in Table 3, an 
over-identification test was used to test for exogeneity in the instrumental variables. 
Test statistics were not significant in columns (1) and (2) and, therefore, do not reject 
the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error 
term. This suggests that the instrumental variables are valid. TDIS continued to yield a 
positive sign and be statistically significant in columns (1) and (2). Its absolute values 
were 14.1 for PACCI and 9.62 for PACCI2, which are similar to those shown in Table 2. 
On the whole, the estimation results for TDIS did not change after controlling for 
endogeneity bias. Thus, from the results of Tables 2 and 3, I propose that the experience 
of a technological disaster increases the perceived risk of a nuclear accident.  
The event that occurred in Fukushima is regarded as not only a natural disaster 
(tsunami and earthquake) but also a manmade disaster (nuclear accident). The 
Fukushima accident is thus regarded as a complex disaster. Furthermore, never before 
in history had people experienced such a devastating combination of nuclear accident 
and natural disaster, although previous manmade nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl 
and Three Mile Island had inflicted terrible harm. Despite the growing number of 
studies concerning natural disasters researchers have not yet investigated how natural 
disasters impact on manmade disaster—there has been no analysis regarding how 
people respond to such a complex disaster. Thus, this paper will be the first to 
investigate this matter, and as such, the findings of this paper are of value to the 
literature on behavioral economics and risk preferences. 
People who have frequently experienced previous manmade disasters are more 
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moderate in their response to the Fukushima accident, even if they have never been 
directly affected by such disasters. This suggests that the development of the mass 
media and its ability to disseminate news and information about the disaster 
immediately after its occurrence has influenced people’s perceptions and views. 
Consequently, policy regarding nuclear power is expected to be influenced. This shows 
that even when a disaster occurs in a distant location and has no physical impact on a 
person’s health, it can still have a critical influence on their views and, in turn, the 
direction of policy. In countries with less developed mass media, information regarding 
unforeseen events such as disasters is updated directly through their direct experience. 
However, through the development of media sources such as the internet, people can 
more easily obtain information about disasters in distant locations. Therefore, 
information can be updated not only through direct experiences, but also through 
indirect experiences. It follows from this that people more frequently ―experience‖ 
disastrous events and hence information updates become more frequent too. 
Consequently, the learning effect will have a greater impact on their decision-making 
when the media coverage is more extensive. I interpret this as implying that the 
development of media has a critical influence on the learning process. The effects of 
such media coverage regarding low-probability events should be taken into account in 
the field of the theory of behavioral economics. 
 
4. Conclusions 
WIN-Gallup International conducted a cross-country survey on views regarding 
nuclear energy immediately after the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. Using this 
data, the present paper explored how the experience of a technological disaster affects 
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the perceived risk of nuclear accidents. An analysis of the data has found that the 
experience of a technological disaster increases the perceived risk of a nuclear accident, 
whereas the experience of a natural disaster does not affect perceptions of risk. From 
this finding, I derive the argument that media coverage regarding low-probability 
disastrous events leads people to more frequently ―experience‖ these events. 
Consequently, information updates become more frequent and so the learning effect has 
a greater influence on their decision-making. 
  The central aim of this paper was to examine people’s perceived risk response to 
Japan’s devastating and complex disaster event of tsunami, earthquake, and nuclear 
accident. However, the data used in this paper is not individual-level data and the 
sample size is very small. For a closer examination and a robustness check of the 
findings in this paper, richer individual-level data are required as well as further 
estimations. This remaining issue will be addressed in future studies.
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Figure 1. Association between the experience of technological disasters and the 
perceived risk of nuclear accidents. 
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Table 1  Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 Definition Mean Max Min Standard 
deviation 
PACCI Rate of respondents who believe that the possibility of a 
nuclear accident is high (or very high) (%) 
42.0 82 5 21.0 
PACCI2 Rate of respondents who believe that the possibility of a 
nuclear accident is very high (%) 
20.1 48 1 13.7 
TDIS Total number of technological disasters since 1990 81.3 744 2 144.0 
NDIS Total number of natural disasters since 1990 74.7 502 1 109.4 
GDP GDP per capita (million dollars) 1.83 4.55 0.21 1.44 
POP Population (million) 110.9 1321.8 0.3 267.8 
GOVSIZ Government size (Government expenditure/GDP) (%) 16.2 59.6 3.24 9.01 
NUCLE Number of nuclear plants. 8.41 105 0 18.9 
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Table 2  OLS estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by standard errors obtained 
using the jackknife method. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1 % levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI 
(2) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI 
(3) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI2 
(4) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI2 
Ln(TDIS) 15.4*** 
(3.04) 
15.1** 
(2.61) 
10.7*** 
(2.81) 
10.4** 
(2.57) 
Ln(NDIS) 6.05 
(1.64) 
7.04 
(1.68) 
1.99 
(0.71) 
2.70 
(0.85) 
Ln(GDP) –3.17 
(–0.76) 
–2.31 
(–0.50) 
–2.17 
(–0.86) 
–1.55 
(–0.56) 
Ln(POP) –16.4*** 
(–3.08) 
–15.8*** 
(–2.75) 
–9.74** 
(–2.42) 
–9.32** 
(–2.14) 
Ln(GOVSIZ) 6.97 
(0.83) 
6.94 
(0.79) 
7.28 
(1.44) 
7.26 
(1.35) 
NUCLE 
 
 –0.10 
(–0.48) 
 –0.07 
(–0.48) 
Constant 
 
149.0** 
(2.42) 
133.2* 
(1.90) 
79.0** 
(2.17) 
67.7 
(1.59) 
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.23 0.30 0.28 
Observations   37   37   37   37 
13 
 
Table 3  GMM 2SLS estimation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by the robust standard errors 
obtained using the jackknife method. * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 
5% levels, respectively. Instrumental variables are population density and land size. 
The Sargan test was used for the over-identification test. 
 
 
 
 (1) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI 
(2) 
Dependent 
variable: 
PACCI2 
Ln(TDIS) 14.1** 
(2.09) 
9.62* 
(1.88) 
Ln(NDIS) 9.17 
(1.36) 
5.13 
(0.91) 
Ln(GDP) –0.48 
(–0.08) 
0.64 
(0.15) 
Ln(POP) –14.3** 
(-2.13) 
–7.91 
(–1.37) 
Ln(GOVSIZ) 7.14 
(0.68) 
6.70 
(1.04) 
NUCLE –0.35 
(–0.60) 
–0.34 
(–0.71) 
Constant 
 
97.2 
(1.01) 
29.6 
(0.39) 
Over-identification  
test 
0.66 
P=0.41 
0.16 
P=0.68 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.26 
Observations   37   37 
